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CASE COMMENT 
 
Lorna Richardson* 
Uneasy on the Eye: Determining the Basis for Contractual Damages including 
Non-Pecuniary Loss 
 
In Peebles v Rembrand Builders Merchants Ltd1 Sheriff Collins QC had to 
consider a number of issues: (i) whether the defenders were in breach of a 
contract for the sale of goods; (ii) on what basis the pursuers were entitled to 
damages for such breach; and (iii) whether a sum could be awarded for loss of 
amenity or inconvenience. 
A THE FACTS 
The first pursuer built a house for himself and the second pursuer, his wife. In 
order to build the roof the pursuers entered into a contract with the defender for 
roof tiles.2 Around five years after delivery of the tiles the pursuers noticed that 
the tiles had a patchy white appearance. This was due to a failure of the coating 
on the tiles. But for this failure the tiles would have retained their appearance 
for at least 15 – 20 years. The problem with the tiles was purely aesthetic, they 
remained wind and watertight.  
Following discussions between the parties and some delay3 the defenders 
carried out repair works to the tiles. This remedial work was not carried out 
correctly and, as such, did not resolve the discolouring of the tiles, although it 
did reduce the problem. The pursuers then asked the defender to replace the 
tiles. The defender refused, instead offering further remedial works.4 Given the 
problems with the tiles and the previous unsuccessful remedial works the 
pursuers refused and raised an action for damages for breach of contract, 
seeking the cost of replacing the tiles at £36,000.5 
B WAS THERE A BREACH OF CONTRACT? 
This point was dealt with fairly shortly by the Sheriff. The contract was a contract 
for the sale of goods to which the Sale of Goods Act 1979 applied.6 By virtue of 
section 14 there was an implied term that the goods be of satisfactory quality. 
In accordance with that section the tiles were of satisfactory quality if they met 
the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking into 
account the description of the tiles, the price paid for them and all other relevant 
circumstances.7 The quality of the tiles included their state and condition, and 
																																																													
* Lecturer in Commercial Law, University of Edinburgh. 
1 [2017] SC DUN 28. 
2 This was a contract for the sale of goods – the tiles were fitted by the first pursuer.  
3 Peebles v Rembrand at findings in fact 12-14. 
4 Ibid at finding in fact 21-23. 
5 The claim included cost of replacement tiles and the cost of the tiles being replaced. At the 
date of the proof the first pursuer was 67 years old and did not consider himself able to do the 
work himself.  
6 Such a contract entered into after 1 October 2015 would be regulated by the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015, not the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  
7 Section 14(2A) 1979 Act. A provision in identical terms is found in s 9(2) 2015 Act.  
in particular, their appearance and finish; and their durability.8 Taking these 
matters into account the Sheriff found that the tiles were not of satisfactory 
quality,9 and as such the defenders were in breach of contract.10  
In considering whether there was a breach of contract following the remedial 
works the Sheriff concluded that there was; noting that the hypothetical person 
of section 14 was ‘neither unduly exacting as to the standard of the quality of 
goods, nor unduly tolerant of defects in them.’11 Damages were therefore to be 
awarded for the period before and after the remedial works were carried out.12 
C BASIS ON WHICH DAMAGES ASSESSED 
The Sheriff began his consideration of this issue by noting the well-
established principle that where a pursuer sustains a loss as a result of a 
breach of contract he is to be put, in so far as money can do so, into the 
position he would have been in if the contract had been performed.13 He went 
on to note that in assessing damages for defective building work the normal 
measure is the cost of reinstatement.14 However, given this was a case 
regarding damages for breach of a contract for the sale of goods the starting 
point was that set out in section 53A of the 1979 Act: which provides that the 
loss is prima facie the difference between the value of goods at the time of 
delivery and the value they would have had if they had conformed to 
contract.15 The pursuers had made no attempt to establish what that loss was. 
In doing so they had, said the Sheriff, implicitly accepted that a diminution in 
value basis would result in no or a very small amount of damages.16 
The Sheriff went on to note that the pursuers’ argument was similar in a 
number of respects to the respondent’s argument in Ruxley Electronics & 
Construction Ltd v Forsyth17  and that it fell to be rejected for similar reasons. 
After considering comments of Lords Jauncey and Lloyd in Ruxley18 the 
Sheriff noted that a pursuer would not be entitled to damages by way of 
reinstatement costs unless these were reasonable in the circumstances. Such 
costs would not be reasonable if they were unnecessary to rectify the defect, 
																																																													
8 See s14(2B) 1979 Act. This is also the position in terms of s 9(3) 2015 Act.  
9 In light of the evidence the Sheriff inferred that the coating problem existed at the date of 
delivery – Peebles v Rembrand at para 56.  
10 Ibid, findings in fact and law 3-4.  
11 Peebles v Rembrand at para 61. 
12	The pursuers, as consumers, would have been able to seek replacement of the tiles in 
terms of ss48A and 48B of the 1979 Act. However they did not seek this remedy. However, 
issues about whether replacement was a proportionate remedy, discussed in relation to 
damages below, would also have arisen should they have done so: see s48B. These sections 
have been repealed in the 1979 Act. Similar provisions are found in s 23 of the 2015 Act.	
13 Para 63.  
14 Para 64, referring to East Ham Corporation v Bernard Stanley & Sons Ltd [1966] AC 406.  
15 Para 64.  
16 Paras 66 – 67.  
17 [1996] AC 344. 
18 Discussed in Peebles v Rembrand at paras 70 – 74.  
because, for instance a less expensive alternative could do so. Reinstatement 
costs would also be unreasonable if they were disproportionate to the benefit 
to be gained. Finally, such costs may not be reasonable if a pursuer did not 
intend to actually carry out the reinstatement works.19 Reasonableness 
therefore went further than questions of mitigation. Given it was for the 
pursuer to establish his loss it was also for him to establish that a claim for 
damages, assessed by reference to reinstatement costs, was reasonable, that 
is to say, that such costs were necessary and proportionate.20  It was for the 
pursuers in this case to do so, by proving that the reinstatement works were 
necessary, which involved establishing that there was no alternative, or that 
there was none that was cheaper than the cost of replacement.21  
The Sheriff held that the damages claimed by the pursuers were not 
reasonable as they were not necessary to rectify the defect; this could be 
done by further remedial works.22 Damages on the basis of reinstatement 
costs were unreasonable as they were disproportionate to the benefit to be 
achieved, given that the tiles remained wind and watertight, and therefore 
functional.23 The Sheriff also considered it unlikely that the pursuers would 
use any award to replace the tiles. This was therefore a further, although 
‘strictly subsidiary reason’ that he did not consider the damages sought to be 
reasonable.24 
D DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF AMENITY OR INCONVENIENCE 
Having come to this view regarding the basis on which damages should be 
awarded the Sheriff then considered whether any damages could be awarded 
for loss or amenity or inconvenience. After considering the opinions on this 
issue of Lords Mustill and Lloyd in Ruxley25 and the speech of Lord Clyde in 
Farley v Skinner26 the Sheriff went on to note that the starting point in this 
case was that it concerned a contract for the sale of roof tiles. While it was 
true that the pursuers wanted the tiles to be of a particular colour and uniform 
in appearance this was ancillary to their main purpose in providing a wind and 
watertight roofing material.27 The contract was therefore not one for pleasure 
or peace. The pursuers’ position was not comparable to the swimming pool in 
Ruxley or the need to be free from aircraft noise in Farley. As such damages 
for loss of amenity could not be awarded.28 
																																																													
19 Para 75.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Para 76.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Para 77. 
24 Para 78.  
25 Paras 83 – 84. 
26 [2002] AC 732, discussed in paras 87 – 88.  
27 Peebles v Rembrand  at para 90. 
28 Ibid.  
The Sheriff did, however, find that by not getting the colour and finish of tiles 
that they contracted for that the pursuers had suffered inconvenience in 
having to live with a roof that was aesthetically unattractive and in the trouble 
they experienced in trying to have the problem rectified.29 He also found that 
the aesthetic defect was a matter that significantly interfered with the 
pursuers’ enjoyment of their home.30 As such the pursuers could be awarded 
damages for inconvenience. 
In finding that damages were recoverable the Sheriff went on to consider 
whether the pursuers had failed to mitigate their loss in failing to allow the 
defenders a further opportunity to rectify the defect. He found that they had 
acted unreasonably, noting that the pursuers refused the further remedial 
works because, by that stage, they had come to the view that they were 
entitled to have the tiles replaced.31 The Sheriff noted,  
[a]ggrieved though they were entitled to be about the failure to carry 
out the remedial works properly, it was in the circumstances 
unreasonable to refuse further remedial work works because they 
insisted on an alternative remedy which was itself not reasonable.32 
The pursuers were therefore not entitled to damages for the period since 
refusing further remedial work.33  
In determining the level of damages the Sheriff acknowledged that this was a 
necessarily imprecise exercise but that in doing so he had to take account of 
the strong admonitions in Ruxley and Farley that any award should be modest. 
He found the defenders liable in damages of £1,500.34  
E CONCLUSIONS 
This case raises a number of interesting issues in relation to the basis on which 
and the extent to which damages can be recovered. Of particular note is the 
Sheriff’s comments regarding the onus on the pursuers to prove their loss, 
involving proving that there was no alternative to the cost of replacement. This 
is contrary to Inner House authority on how damages should be assessed.  
																																																													
29 Para 91.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Para 92. The position would be different if the pursuers had been able to make use of the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015. Under s24(5) the consumer buyer has the final right to reject 
where after one repair the goods still do not conform to contract. However, this may not have 
been a useful remedy for the pursuers as s24(8) provides that a refund to the consumer of 
the price paid for the goods can be reduced by a deduction, to take account of the use the 
consumer has had of the goods since they were delivered. The tiles were delivered in 
2003/2004 (the report does not provide the exact date) and the pursuers sought to reject 
them in 2012.  
32 Peebles v Rembrand at para 92.  
33 Ibid, para 93.  
34 Ibid, paras  94 – 95.  
In Duke of Portland v Wood’s Trustees 35  the Inner House was asked to 
determine whether damages should be assessed on the basis of reinstatement 
costs or loss of profit, on the basis that the property could not be used in the 
condition in which it was returned by the tenant. In that case Lord President 
Clyde noted, 
The measures employed to estimate the money value of anything 
(including the damage flowing from a breach of contract) are not to be 
confounded with the value which it is sought to estimate; and the true 
value may only be found after employing more measures than one – in 
themselves all legitimate, but none of them necessarily conclusive by 
itself – and checking one result with the other.36 
On the basis of this authority it is for the court to consider the various ways in 
which loss might be assessed, as set out in the parties’ averments, and to 
determine which is the most appropriate, each acting as a cross-check against 
the other, rather than the pursuer having to prove that the loss he seeks is the 
only reasonable measure of loss. Indeed, in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
James Grant & Co (West) Ltd37 Lord McDonald noted, 
The pursuers are entitled, in the first instance, to quantify their claim by 
reference to what it will cost to do the work which the defenders have 
failed to do. If the defenders can prove that the true loss suffered by the 
pursuers is materially less than this it is open to them, on suitable 
averments to do so. I do not consider that it is incumbent on the pursuers 
at this stage to enumerate in their pleadings all the legitimate but not 
necessarily conclusive measures of damages, to check these against 
each other and to produce, as a matter of averment, a figure reached on 
this basis. They have produced a prima facie figure based upon the 
readily ascertainable figure of cost of repair and it is for the defenders, if 
they can, to aver and prove that it is too high.38 
The onus is therefore on the defender to prove that the basis of measuring loss 
used by the pursuer is too high, rather than it being for the pursuer to show that 
it is a reasonable basis. That said, a pursuer would be well advised to plead an 
esto case with damages assessed on a different basis, where the defender has 
raised the issue in their pleadings. This would then allow the pursuer to lead 
evidence as to quantification on that alternative basis.  
The Sheriff also had to navigate the thorny issue of when non-pecuniary loss 
can be recovered for breach of contract. In doing so the Sheriff relied on Lord 
Clyde’s analysis in Farley as the basis for his decision that the pursuers had 
																																																													
35 1926 SC 640.  
36 Ibid at 652.  
37 1982 SLT 423.  
38 Ibid at 424, emphasis added.  
suffered inconvenience and as such were entitled to damages. However 
Lords Steyn, Scott39 and Clyde also found that damages could have been 
awarded on that basis. The more difficult question is determining the 
difference between disappointment (for which recovery is not permitted unless 
an important term of the contract is to provide the pursuer with pleasure or 
peace of mind40) and inconvenience. This is where Lord Clyde’s analysis in 
Farley seems to differ from the other judges. Lords Steyn, Scott and Clyde all 
refer to physical inconvenience,41 with Lord Scott explaining that if the cause 
of the inconvenience or discomfort is sensory: affecting sight, touch, hearing 
or smell, damages could be recoverable. Whereas for Lord Clyde there was 
‘no particular magic in the word “physical”’.42 Lord Clyde considered the term 
‘inconvenience’ covered ‘the kinds of difficulty and discomfort which are more 
than mere matters of sentimentality.’43 He found that the aircraft noise in 
Farley significantly interfered with the pursuer’s enjoyment of his property and 
that such inconvenience was recoverable.44 This seems to come close to the 
loss of amenity that Mr Forsyth was held to have suffered in Ruxley.  
It may be that the Sheriff’s findings on pecuniary loss in this case meant he 
was more disposed to finding that non-pecuniary losses were recoverable so 
that the defenders were held liable for their breach of contract. Ruxley would 
perhaps have been a better foundation for this aspect of his decision. 
It may be that any use of this case in future will focus on this aspect of the 
decision, and it may be a step on the road to increasing the ability to recover 
for non-pecuniary loss.   
 
 
 
  
 
  
																																																													
39 With both of whom Lord Browne Wilkinson agreed.  
40 Farley. 
41 Ibid at paras 30; 60; and 85.  
42 Ibid at para 35.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid at para 37.  
